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THE FAILURE OF FANNIE MAE AND
FREDDIE MAC AND THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE
HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
Thomas H. Stanton*
In devising the government’s response to the Great
Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt turned not only to
bankers, economists and lawyers, but also to scholars and
practitioners in the field of public administration such as Charles
Merriam and Louis Brownlow.1 This article seeks to build on
that tradition. While other disciplines concern themselves with
devising appropriate policies, public administration focuses more
on trying to ensure that those policies are effectively
implemented.
Lessons from public administration, and especially the art of
organizational design, provide insight about the failure of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and also suggest more stable means for
government to support today’s troubled housing finance system.
*Thomas H. Stanton is a Fellow of the Center for the Study of American
Government at Johns Hopkins University. He is a member of the board of
directors of the National Academy of Public Administration and a former
member of the federal Senior Executive Service. His publications include two
books on government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and two edited books on
federal organization and management. Concerns expressed in A State of Risk:
Will Government Sponsored Enterprises be the next Financial Crisis?
(HarperCollins, 1991) helped lead to the enactment of several pieces of
legislation and the creation of a new GSE regulator, the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Mr. Stanton’s B.A. degree is from
the University of California at Davis, M.A. from Yale University, and J.D.
from the Harvard Law School.
1
See, e.g., PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY:
COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905–1996, at 81–117 (1998).
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Part I of this Article outlines how the two companies failed
as a result of high leverage, poor business decisions, and weak
regulatory supervision. Part II describes inherent vulnerabilities
of the government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) as an
organizational form. Specifically, GSE officers and directors
have a legal obligation to serve shareholders and this can
conflict with pressure from other stakeholders to serve the public
purposes for which the GSE is chartered. Often this tension is
manageable but at key times it is not. The GSE uses its
government backing to gain so much power as to dominate
virtually any system of financial accountability that government
might try to establish. Part III evaluates the GSE as an
organizational form. While the GSE may possess greater
capacity and flexibility than a wholly owned government
corporation or other government agency, it is subject to only
limited accountability and displays significant vulnerabilities as it
evolves over its organizational life-cycle.
Part IV recommends that the two GSEs be placed into
receivership and converted into wholly owned government
corporations. The article concludes that the two government
corporations should either be terminated after five years or, if
policymakers believe that there is yet further value to be gained
from them at that time, that they be organized into a single
government corporation and reauthorized on a five-year cycle to
periodically determine whether their public benefits still
outweigh their public costs. Caution is merited here because of
the systemic implications of concentrating so much financial risk
into a single specialized financial institution, whether in the
public or private sector.
I. WHY FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC FAILED
On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
voluntarily went into conservatorship.2 As they recognize their

2

See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2008) (prescribing the terms of
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through the Federal Housing
Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act of 1992); James B. Lockhart, Dir., Fed.
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losses it becomes clear that taxpayer costs from the government
backing of the two companies will be substantial.3
The two companies are government-sponsored enterprises,
privately owned companies that, before their failure, benefitted
from the perception that the government would back their debt
obligations and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).4 There are
Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart (Sept.
7,
2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/economy/lockhart_
statement/index.htm (“In order to restore balance between safety and
soundness and mission, FHFA has placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
conservatorship.”); Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y, Treasury Department,
Statement on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to
Protect
Financial
Markets
and
Taxpayers
(Sept.
7,
2008),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm (“I support the Director’s
decision as necessary and appropriate and had advised him that
conservatorship was the only form in which I would commit taxpayer dollars
to the GSEs.”). The law prescribes that the regulator should use
conservatorship to restore the companies to financial health. See, e.g., FED.
HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
CONSERVATORSHIP 2 (2008) (“A conservatorship is the legal process in
which a person or entity is appointed to establish control and oversight over a
Company to put it in a sound and solvent condition. In a conservatorship, the
powers of the Company’s directors, officers, and shareholders are transferred
to the designated Conservator.”).
3
See Dawn Kopecki, Fannie, Freddie Won’t Repay All Aid, Lockhart
Says, BLOOMBERG, July 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601103&sid=aEwoLtQMHq5Y (“Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, the largest U.S. mortgage-finance companies, won’t be able to repay all
of the $84.9 billion in federal aid they have received since being seized by
the government last year, their regulator said.”).
4
More formally, a government-sponsored enterprise is a government
chartered, privately owned and privately controlled institution that, while
lacking an express government guarantee, benefits from the perception that
the government stands behind its financial obligations. See Ronald C. Moe &
Thomas H. Stanton, Government Sponsored Enterprises as Federal
Instrumentalities:
Reconciling
Private
Management
with
Public
Accountability, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 321, 321–22 (1989); accord 2 U.S.C.
§ 622(8) (2009) (definition Congress enacted in amendments to the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974). The Treasury purchase of stock in
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008, and its commitment to
infuse up to $200 billion into the companies as needed, made the
government’s backing explicit rather than implicit, as it had been before the
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five GSEs: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan
Bank System, the Farm Credit System and a small GSE known
as Farmer Mac.5 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac
are investor-owned. The Farm Credit System and Federal Home
Loan Bank System are cooperatives, owned by their memberborrowers.6 A sixth GSE, Sallie Mae, which funds student
loans, gave up its government sponsorship and became a
completely private investor-owned company.7
The housing bubble was an unprecedented increase in
housing prices averaging over 100 percent from 2000–2006 in
urban areas, followed by a substantial drop in prices.8 The
failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cannot be attributed
solely to the housing credit bubble and collapse. Rather, it
appears that the collapse of the housing credit bubble was a
precipitating event with consequences that could have been
avoided by more prudent practices by the two GSEs and their
management, and that revealed shortcomings in the GSE as an
institutional form.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac committed serious
misjudgments that helped to bring about their insolvency. The
most serious misjudgments involved the companies’ resistance to
accepting more effective supervision and capital standards.9 For
companies went into government hands.
5
THOMAS H. STANTON, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:
MERCANTILIST COMPANIES IN THE MODERN WORLD 1 (2002) [hereinafter
STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES].
6
Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Reality
Catches up to Public Administration Theory, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV 632, 632
(2009) [hereinafter Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory].
7
Thomas H. Stanton, Reducing Government Involvement in a Market:
Lessons from the Privatization of Sallie Mae, 28 PUB. BUDGETING. & FIN.
101–23 (2008) [hereinafter Stanton, Reducing Government Involvement].
8
See, e.g., MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 360º LOOK AT THE
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL
CRISIS (2009).
9
Among the bills that the GSEs helped to defeat in the years 2000–2007
were Fed. Hous. Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act, S. 1100, 110th Cong.
(2007) (enacted); Fed. Hous. Fin. Reform Act, H.R. 1427, 110th Cong.
(2007) (enacted); Fed. Hous. Fin. Reform Act, 109th Cong. (2005)
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years, starting with their successful efforts to weaken the
legislation that established their regulator, the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),10 the two companies
managed to fend off capital standards that would have reduced
their excessive leverage and provided a cushion to absorb
potential losses.11 In 2007 Freddie Mac concluded a stock
buyback program that further weakened the company’s ability to
withstand a financial shock.12 As late as March 2008, Freddie

(enacted); Fed. Hous. Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act, S. 190, 109th
Cong. (2005); Fed. Hous. Enterprise Oversight Modernization Act, S. 1656,
108th Cong. (2003); Leave No Securities Behind Act, H.R. 2022, 108th
Cong. (2003); Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprises Regulatory
Improvement Act, H.R. 2575, 108th Cong. (2003); Hous. Fin. Regulatory
Restructuring Act, H.R. 2803, 107th Cong. (2002); Secondary Mortgage
Market Enterprises Regulatory Improvement Act, H.R. 1409, 107th Cong.
(2001); Hous. Fin. Regulatory Improvement Act, H.R. 3703, 106th Cong.
(2000).
10
Many reports document the successful efforts of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac at weakening the legislation creating OFHEO and prescribing
their capital standards. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon, Privileged Position:
Fannie Mae Expected to Escape Attempt at Tighter Regulation, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 1992, at A1; Stephen Labaton, Power of the Mortgage Twins:
Fannie and Freddie Guard Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12 1991, at D1;
Carol Matlack, Getting Their Way, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 27, 1990, at 2584–88;
Jill Zuckman, Bills to Increase GSE Oversight Move Ahead in House, Senate,
CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 3, 1991, http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/
cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/weeklyreport/102/wr404032.html@allnewsarchi
ve&metapub=CQ-WEEKLYREPORT&searchIndex=5&seqNum=6.
11
See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., Address at the UC Berkley/UCLA Symposium: The Future of
Mortgage Finance in the U.S. (Oct. 31, 2008) (“For example, the GSEs were
reluctant earlier this year to raise capital and to expand their operations, even
though this would have helped financial and macroeconomic stability at a
time of much-reduced mortgage availability. The GSEs’ disinclination to
support the mortgage market was motivated by the fact that raising additional
capital would have diluted the values of the holding of the existing private
shareholders.”).
12
FREDDIE MAC, 2007 ANN. REP. at 25 (“On March 23, 2007, we
announced that our board of directors had authorized us to repurchase up to
$1 billion of outstanding shares of common stock. The repurchase program
was completed in August 2007.”).
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Mac defied calls to increase its capital cushion.13 As late as
summer 2008, Fannie Mae continued to resist legislation that
would give a federal regulator the discretion to set higher capital
standards.14 As a result the two companies were far too weak
financially to cope with any significant financial stress that might
occur.
The companies fought for high leverage because it benefited
their shareholders and managers, at least until the companies
failed.15 Freddie Mac reported returns on equity of over 20
percent in most years since becoming an investor-owned
company in 1989, reaching highs of 47.2 percent in 2002 and
39.0 percent in 2000.16 Fannie Mae reported earnings of almost
17
as much, reaching a high of 39.8 percent in 2001. The two
companies fought higher capital requirements because more
capital would have diluted those returns to shareholders.18
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac compounded the problem of
their self-inflicted structural vulnerabilities with a series of
misjudgments that involved taking on excessive risk just at the
19
point that housing prices were peaking. According to press
reports, the chief executives of both Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac disregarded warnings from their risk officers and greatly
increased their purchases of risky loans to catch up with the

13

David S. Hilzenrath, Chief Says Freddie Won’t Raise Capital:
Mortgage Financer Cites Responsibility to Shareholders, Won’t Increase Loan
Capacity, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at D04.
14
Steven Sloan, Fannie CEO Details Issues with GSE Bill, AM. BANKER,
June 5, 2008, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/173_109/-3544971.html.
15
Bernanke, supra note 11.
16
FED. HOUS. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 110, 127 (2008) (Freddie
Mac).
17
Id. at 127.
18
See supra notes 9–11.
19
See James B. Lockhart, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA’S First
Anniversary and Challenges Ahead (July 30, 2009) (transcript available in the
National Press Club) (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not create the
housing price bubble, but their procyclical actions further inflated the bubble,
despite our regulatory efforts to curtail their growth.”).
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market.20 The following excerpts from their annual reports
indicate that the two GSEs took on substantial risk from
purchasing subprime mortgages (i.e., those with borrowers who
failed to meet traditional standards of creditworthiness), “Alt-A”
mortgages (i.e., “Alternative-A” mortgages which lacked
verification of crucial data about creditworthiness such as the
borrower’s income), “interest-only” mortgages (those that
permitted borrowers to continue to accrue mortgage principal
without paying it down in a timely fashion), and adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs) (those that allowed mortgage interest rates
and borrowers’ required monthly payments to increase over time
according to a stated index even though the borrower might have
qualified only to make monthly payments on the mortgage at a
lower interest rate).21 Freddie Mac reported in its 2007 Annual
Report that:
[t]he proportion of higher risk mortgage loans that were
originated in the market during the last four years
increased significantly. We have increased our
securitization volume of non-traditional mortgage
products, such as interest-only loans and loans originated
with less documentation in the last two years in response
to the prevalence of these products within the origination
market. Total non-traditional mortgage products,
including those designated as Alt-A and interest-only
loans, made up approximately 30% and 24% of our
single-family mortgage purchase volume in the years

20

See., e.g., Charles Duhigg, The Reckoning: Pressured to Take More
Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/business/05fannie.html;
Charles
Duhigg, At Freddie Mac, Chief Discarded Warning Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/business/05freddie.html; David
S. Hilzenrath, Fannie’s Perilous Pursuit of Subprime Loans: As It Tried to
Increase Its Business, Company Gave Risks Short Shrift, Documents Show,
WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2008, at D01.
21
Among the most financially risky ARMs were those with initial low
rates (so-called “teaser rates”) that reset to much higher rates after two or
three years.
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ended December 31, 2007 and 2006, respectively.22
Fannie Mae’s 2007 Annual Report states:
[w]e are experiencing high serious delinquency rates and
credit losses across our conventional single-family
mortgage credit book of business, especially for loans to
borrowers with low credit scores and loans with high
loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios. In addition, in 2007 we
experienced particularly rapid increases in serious
delinquency rates and credit losses in some higher risk
loan categories, such as Alt-A loans, adjustable-rate
loans, interest-only loans, negative amortization loans,
loans made for the purchase of condominiums and loans
with second liens. Many of these higher risk loans were
originated in 2006 and the first half of 2007.23
Fannie Mae reported that purchases of interest-only and
negative amortizing ARMs amounted to 7% of its business
volume in 2007 and 12% in both 2006 and 2005.24 Moreover,
Alt-A mortgage loans “represented approximately 16%
of . . . single-family business volume in 2007, compared with
approximately 22% and 16% in 2006 and 2005, respectively.”25
Both companies also invested in highly rated private-label,
mortgage-related securities, backed by Alt-A or subprime
mortgage loans, amounting to total holdings by the two
companies of over $200 billion in 2007.26
In short, the mix of private incentives and government
backing created a dynamic leading not only to the hubris that
brought about the meltdown of internal controls at both Fannie
27
Mae and Freddie Mac a few years ago, but also to their

22

FREDDIE MAC, 2007 ANN. REP., at 13.
FANNIE MAE, 2007 ANN. REP., at 24.
24
Id. at 128.
25
Id. at 129.
26
FANNIE MAE, 2007 ANN. REP. 93 (2008); FREDDIE MAC, 2007 ANN.
REP. 94 (2008).
27
Thomas H. Stanton, The Life Cycle of the Government-Sponsored
Enterprise: Lessons for Design and Accountability, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
837, 840 [hereinafter Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability] (2007).
23
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insolvency in 2008.
That said, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not cause the
housing bubble or the proliferation of subprime and other
mortgages that borrowers could not afford to repay. In analyzing
the dynamics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, I discovered a
phenomenon that can be called Stanton’s Law: risk will migrate
to the place where government is least equipped to deal with it.28
Thus, the capital markets arbitraged across regulatory
requirements and sent literally trillions of dollars of mortgages
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,29 where capital requirements
were low and federal supervision was weak.30
However, the capital markets also found other places where
government could not manage the risk,31 including structured
investment vehicles of commercial banks, private securitization
conduits, and collateralized debt obligations that were virtually
unregulated except by the vagaries of the rating agencies and
exuberance of the market during the housing bubble.32 Huge
28

I first presented this dynamic in 1989 testimony before the Senate
Banking Committee, where I pointed out that increases in stringency of
capital requirements and government supervision for thrift institutions after
the savings and loan debacle would drive many billions of dollars of
mortgages from the portfolios of savings and loan associations to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac because their capital standards and government oversight
were much weaker. The Safety and Soundness of Government Sponsored
Enterprises: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong. 41, 52 (1989) (statement of Thomas H. Stanton,
Attorney at Law).
29
See, e.g., Report to Congress 2008, supra note 16, at 111 tbl.4
(Fannie Mae), 128 tbl.11 (Freddie Mac) for the annual growth of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.
30
See supra notes 9–11.
31
See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition: Lessons of the Financial Crisis for
Banking Supervision (May 7, 2009).
32
See, e.g., Markus Brunnermeier et al., The Fundamental Principles of
Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11,
Preliminary Conference Draft, Centre for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR), Jan. 2009, app. A “The Boundary Problem in Financial
Regulation,” at 63–69.
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volumes of subprime, Alt-A, interest-only and other “toxic
mortgages” went to these parts of the market.33 As the bubble
reached its limits and began to deflate, the GSEs tried to catch
up and regain the market share that they had lost to the new
competition. Former Freddie Mac CEO Richard Syron explained
the pressures on the GSEs:
The subprime market was developed largely by private
label participants, as were most non-traditional mortgage
products. Freddie Mac entered the non-traditional slice of
the market because, as the private lending sector shifted
toward those types of loans, Freddie needed to participate
in order to carry out its public mission of promoting
affordability, liquidity and stability in housing finance. In
addition, if it had not done so, it could not have
remained competitive or even relevant in the residential
mortgage market we were designed to serve.34
II. LESSONS FROM THE FAILURE OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
MAC
Many other kinds of financial institutions have failed in the
current debacle, including commercial banks, thrift institutions,
mortgage companies, and insurance companies. Among all of
these, the GSE has specific shortcomings that call the value of
this institutional form into doubt.
In making their mistakes, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
revealed the inherent vulnerabilities of the GSE as an
organizational model. First, the GSE lives or dies according to
its charter and other laws that determine the conditions under
35
which it operates. That means that GSEs must balance their
33

Id.
The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform, 110th
Cong. 17–22 (2008) [hereinafter Syron Statement] (statement of Richard F.
Syron, Former CEO of Freddie Mac), available at http://oversight.house.
gov/story.asp?ID=2252.
35
See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, 2007 ANN. REP., at 29–31 (“As a federally
chartered corporation, we are subject to the limitations imposed by the
34
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profit goals against public purposes and those interests of
stakeholders which can influence their charters.
Second, the GSE combines private ownership with
government backing in a way that creates a political force that
can dominate virtually any safety-and-soundness framework.
GSEs select chief officers, in good part, based on their ability to
manage political risk,36 rather than on their ability to manage
two of the largest financial institutions in the world. This article
will consider these issues in turn.
A. GSEs Are Inherently Difficult if Not Impossible to Manage
The GSE business model, involving private ownership and
public purposes, is difficult, if not impossible, to manage.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were more vulnerable than
commercial banks or other federal instrumentalities to the
contradictions between the requirement to serve private
shareholders and the need to serve public purposes that other
stakeholders, including members of Congress, guarded and

Charter Act, extensive regulation, supervision and examination by OFHEO
and HUD, and regulation by other federal agencies, including the Department
of the Treasury and the SEC. We are also subject to many laws and
regulations that affect our business, including those regarding taxation and
privacy. In addition, the policy, approach or regulatory philosophy of these
agencies can materially affect our business.”).
36
For example, in the mid-1990s the Congressional Budget Office
reported on some of Fannie Mae’s activities:
In keeping with its fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and its
own financial interests, the management of the housing GSEs has
devoted a significant (but undisclosed) portion of the enterprises’
resources to countering—or hedging—that political risk . . . . Fannie
Mae, in particular, makes no secret of its attempts to influence
federal policy toward the GSEs as a means of controlling political
risk . . . . Significantly, too, Fannie Mae explicitly includes the
contribution to preserving its ‘franchise’ when evaluating the
performance of executive staff.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ASSESSING THE PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 36–37 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
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enforced.37
It has long been recognized that GSEs are a special type of
federal instrumentality.38 Other federal instrumentalities include
most commercial banks and thrift institutions and other for-profit
and nonprofit institutions chartered to serve public purposes.39 In
contrast to those other instrumentalities, the officers and
directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac seem to have had a
much more difficult time balancing their fiduciary
responsibilities to shareholders against the public purposes of
their charter acts.40 Pressure from stakeholders to carry out
public purposes,41 too, has conflicted with the GSEs’
responsibility to maintain themselves as sources of long-term
37

Richard Syron, Freddie Mac’s former CEO, pointed to this issue:
Freddie Mac is a shareholder-owned corporation, chartered for the
public purpose of supporting America’s mortgage finance markets,
and operating under government mandates. We had obligations to
Congress and to the public to promote our chartered purposes of
increasing affordability, liquidity and stability in housing finance,
which included some very specific low-income housing goals.
Syron Statement, supra note 34.
38
STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 13–32 ch.2.
39
See, e.g., THOMAS H. STANTON, A STATE OF RISK: WILL
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES BE THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS?
App. A, at 205–07 (1991) [hereinafter STANTON, A STATE OF RISK]; Thomas
H. Stanton, Federal Supervision of Safety and Soundness of GovernmentSponsored Enterprises, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 395 (1991) [hereinafter Stanton,
Federal Supervision].
40
Richard Syron, Freddie Mac’s former CEO, faced this problem:
Freddie Mac chief executive Richard F. Syron . . . said yesterday
that conflicting demands on the government-chartered mortgage giant
have made his job “almost impossible.”
On the eve of Freddie Mac’s quarterly earnings report, Syron said
that the McLean company has been whipsawed by the dual tasks of
creating profit for private investors and serving the public by
boosting the housing market. “What this organization is all about is
balancing among the different missions,” Syron said in an interview.
“It makes the job almost impossible.”
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, Freddie CEO Feels Strain of
Firm’s Twin Missions, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2008, at D01.
41
See, e.g., Syron Statement, supra note 34.
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strength to the housing market.42
Perhaps most eloquent on this issue was Daniel Mudd, the
former CEO of Fannie Mae, who testified in December 2008:
I would advocate moving the GSEs out of No Man’s
Land. Events have shown how difficult it is to balance
financial, capital, market, housing, shareholder,
bondholder, homeowner, private, and public interests in
a crisis of these proportions. We should examine whether
the economy and the markets are better served by fully
private or fully public GSEs.43
There were several reasons why Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac were susceptible to being whipsawed between their
fiduciary obligations to shareholders and their public purposes.
One source of mischief was the fact that the two companies
were chartered by an act of Congress rather than by an
independent federal administrative agency. Members of
Congress could constantly pressure Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to undertake unwise lending policies. The two GSEs
complied as a way to buy loyalty from the relevant
congressional committees that otherwise might accede to
requests from the Treasury or others to impose higher capital
requirements or other restrictions that were unwelcome to
shareholders. For example, Mr. Mudd testified that he felt
pressure to increase Fannie Mae’s market activity even as other

42

[W]e have to confront the future of the secondary mortgage
market, which will, I believe, shape the other decisions. That has to
be the first principle as we . . . evaluate the options for Fannie
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s future. A second principle is that the
Enterprises or any successors should have a well-defined and
internally consistent mission based on their fundamental role in the
mortgage market. Their mission activities should not require
excessive risk taking as it did in the past.
Lockhart, supra note 19.
43
The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th
Cong. 25–26 (2008) (written statement of Daniel H. Mudd, Former Interim
CEO of Fannie Mae), available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.
asp?ID=2252.
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institutions were stepping back because of declining market
conditions.44 Stakeholder pressure to serve public purposes was
substantial; by contrast, far fewer stakeholders pushed to ensure
effective supervision of safety and soundness.45
In addition, the GSEs selected a political strategy of
achieving short-term goals at the potential cost of longer term
achievements. Their refusal to accept bank-type capital
requirements and a bank-type supervisory framework for
accountability has already been mentioned.46 The GSEs
marshaled so much political power that they simply dominated
their environment and dampened feedback signals that might
have helped company officials to make better decisions.47 In
return, however, the GSEs had to buy off stakeholders with
large volumes of mortgage purchases that they, or at least their
risk officers, knew were unwise.48
In their governance shortcomings, the two GSEs
compounded the more general problem that the current debacle
has revealed. Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan
Greenspan, put it best:
I made a mistake in presuming that the self interest of
organizations, specifically banks and others, was such
44

Id.
JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT:
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL
107, Cambridge University Press (2003).
46
See sources cited supra notes 9–17.
47
This problem is analyzed with respect to the two GSEs’ failed internal
controls in Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 27.
48
See sources cited supra note 20. Confidential company documents
released by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on
December 9, 2008 detail some of the pressures on the companies and the
mistakes made by the GSEs during 2005 through 2007. In particular, these
documents indicate that the GSEs sought yield and market share despite
added risk from nontraditional mortgage products and warnings from risk
officers. Fannie Mae Office of Corporate Strategy, Memorandum to Daniel
Mudd . . . from Gary Friend, Subject: CONFIDENTIAL Cambridge
Summary, July 7, 2006, available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20081209131806.pdf (“Single Family’s strategy is to say ‘yes’ to our
customers by increasing purchases of sub-prime and Alt-A loans . . . .”).
45
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that they were best capable of protecting their own
shareholders and the equity in the firms.49
There are significant governance implications of this
admission, coming as it does from a firm believer in the
efficiency of market forces.50 Not only GSEs, but other financial
firms also sought ways to increase their leverage and reduce the
quality of their government supervision.51 There was a
difference, though. As they served the perceived interests of
their shareholders, banks and other investors were filled with the
irrational exuberance of the market bubble. In addition, the
GSEs faced (and failed to manage) stakeholder pressure to
engage in activities that they probably knew (as their risk
officers did), could inflict serious harm on the companies.52
B. GSEs Gain Virtually Unstoppable Political Power
The GSE combines private ownership with government
backing in a way that creates a political force that can dominate
virtually any safety-and-soundness framework. The statutory
framework of GSEs also creates special financial vulnerability
because of incentives that GSEs have to appoint CEOs and
senior management that are politically adept and who may not
necessarily be experienced at managing a major financial

49

Kevin G. Hall, Greenspan Takes Some Blame for Financial Meltdown,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/staff/kevin_hall/v-print/story/54712.html.
50
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bd., Speech to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure:
Risk Transfer and Financial Stability (May 5, 2005) (“Except where market
discipline is undermined by moral hazard, for example, because of federal
guarantees of private debt, private regulation generally has proved far better
at constraining excessive risk-taking than has government regulation.”).
51
See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, The Reckoning: Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let
Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008 (reporting an SEC rule
change which allowed investment banks to increase leverage significantly,
enacted at behest of the regulated firms).
52
See sources cited supra note 20.
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institution.53
A GSE lives or dies according to the terms of its enabling
legislation.54 Especially GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac that are directly chartered by Congress have tended (albeit
not invariably) to select CEOs because of their ability to manage
political risk rather than the risks that derive from their financial
activities.55 This was seen in the newest GSE, Farmer Mac,
which returned to Congress several times since its original
authorization in 1987 requesting adjustments to its charter
powers so that it could offer increasingly profitable financial
services. Farmer Mac has never been a strong success in public
policy terms56 and has invested heavily in assets that have
57
nothing to do with meeting public needs.

53

KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 101 (“ . . . Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
rosters boast numerous alumni of the executive and legislative branches . . .
Furthermore, there is an impressive history of GSE executives crossing back
into government service, giving the company advantages in terms of access,
and sympathy, at the highest levels.”).
54
STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 70–75 (“From
mercantilist times, companies with special charter privileges have understood
that their ultimate success or failure hinges even more on politics than on the
efficient provision of services.”).
55
KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 99 (“[S]ince every aspect of their
operations can be affected by congressional action, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac have powerful incentives to devote significant attention to Congress and
politics in general. Thus one can conclude that GSEs will possess resources
and motive to expend these resources for political advantage.”) (emphasis in
original).
56
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON CAPITAL MARKETS, SEC. AND GOV’T-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES,
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND FIN. SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FARMER MAC: REVISED CHARTER ENHANCES SECONDARY MARKET
ACTIVITY, BUT GROWTH DEPENDS ON VARIOUS FACTORS, GAO/GGD-99-85
(May 1999).
57
Among other investments having nothing to do with its public purpose,
in September 2008 Farmer Mac held in its investment portfolio $50.0 million
of Fannie Mae floating rate preferred stock and $60.0 million of Lehman
Brothers senior debt securities. After taking losses on these investments the
GSE was recapitalized on September 30, 2008 by issuing new stock to
institutions of the Farm Credit System, another GSE, and thereby averted
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made a practice of mastering
political risk, both by providing blandishments to favored
members of the political establishment and other stakeholders,
and by aggressively containing threats to what the companies
considered their franchise value.58 The GSEs are active
participants in the process of influencing policymakers,
especially those who are in positions to affect their charter
legislation.59 On April 19, 2006, Freddie Mac paid a record fine
to the Federal Election Commission to settle charges that the
company violated federal law by using company resources to
hold some $1.7 million in fundraisers, many involving the thenChairman of the House Financial Services Committee.60 That
Committee is responsible for the legislation that created both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and periodically considered
legislation to address shortcomings in their supervision.61
insolvency. See Farmer Mac, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 44 (Nov. 10,
2008).
58
This has been a long-standing policy. In 1991 Representative Jim
Leach (R-IA) stated:
[I]t is not surprising that Fannie and Freddie are beginning to exhibit
that arrogant characteristic of a duopoly, controlling 90% of the
market. Such market dominance allows for heavy-handed approaches
to competitors, to financial intermediaries, and to consumers.
Competitors such as community based savings and loan associations
and commercial banks are also users of GSE services. They are
understandably apprehensive about expressing reservations about
their practices in fear of retaliation. Likewise, would-be competitors
such as securities firms run well known market risks if they object
or attempt to compete with Fannie and Freddie. The two GSEs
distribute billions of dollars of business on Wall Street and have a
reputation of not cottoning to challengers of the status quo.
H.COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, H.R. Rep. No. 102206, at 122 (1991) (Dissenting Views of Representative Jim Leach from
Report to accompany H.R. 2900 on the Government-Sponsored Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1991).
59
KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 99.
60
See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note
27.
61
Id. Almost all of the legislation cited supra in note 9, falls within the
jurisdiction of the House Financial Services Committee.
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Professor Jonathan Koppell notes that “the characteristics
that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from
traditional government agencies and private companies endow
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources.”62
The potential inability of government to supervise safety and
soundness of the GSEs has long been recognized. The Treasury
pointed this out in a 1991 study of GSEs:
The problem of avoiding capture appears to be
particularly acute in the case of regulation of GSEs. The
principal GSEs are few in number; they have highly
qualified staffs; they have strong support for their
programs from special interest groups; and they have
significant resources with which to influence political
outcomes. A weak financial regulator would find GSE
political power overwhelming and even the most
powerful and respected government agencies would find
regulating such entities a challenge.63
The Treasury knew whereof it spoke. There are at least two
cases on record where the Treasury Department, which had no
safety-and-soundness regulatory authority over Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, reportedly came under pressure and agreed to
make its reported views more congenial to the two companies.64
62

KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 97.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 1991 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY ON GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 8 (1991).
64
On the weakening of a 1996 Treasury report on desirability and
feasibility of removing government sponsorship from Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, see, for example, Jackie Calmes, Federal Mortgage Firm Is
Facing New Assault to Privileged Status: But Fannie Has Clout to Counter
the Agencies That Seek to Privatize It, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1986, at 1;
Chairman Richard Baker, comments, U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Securities, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Oversight of the
Federal National Mortgage Association [Fannie Mae] and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation [Freddie Mac], 104th Congress, 2nd session
136–41 (July 24, 1996). For discussion of possible pressure in 1991 on
Treasury to state that HUD would be an appropriate regulator of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, see Thomas H. Stanton, Increasing the Accountability of
Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Next Steps, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 572
63
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Thanks to the lobbying power of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, OFHEO was, at its creation, an institution that lacked the
capacity to do its job.65 OFHEO was limited by the
appropriations process and had a budget that was much smaller,
in comparison to its responsibilities, than the budgets of federal
bank regulators.66
Whenever OFHEO tried to do its job well, as in the 2004
Special Examination Report on Fannie Mae, it experienced
political pressure.67 Fannie Mae lobbyists generated a
congressional request for the Inspector General (IG) of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to
investigate OFHEO’s conduct of the special examination.68
Between October 2002 and June 2004, there were three other
congressional requests for IG investigations of OFHEO.69 Fannie
Mae lobbyists also tried to use the appropriations process to
force a change in the leadership of OFHEO. They convinced the
relevant Senate Appropriations Subcommittee to try to withhold
$10 million from OFHEO’s appropriation until a new OFHEO
director was appointed.70
The enactment of a stronger supervisory framework in 2008
meant that the new regulator, the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA), was no longer subject to the appropriations
process.71 However, the political strength of the GSEs was
reflected in the fact that the new legislation, improving as it did

(1991), and articles cited therein.
65
STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 42.
66
See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note
27.
67
OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT, REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL EXAMINATION OF FANNIE MAE 273–77 (May 2006), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/747/FNMSPECIALEXAM.pdf.
68
Id. at 273.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 284.
71
Section 1106 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(HERA), Pub. L. 110-289, amended the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises
Safety and Soundness Act to remove the new regulator from the
appropriations process.
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on the old law, continued to deny the regulator the mandate,
discretion, or authority to regulate safety and soundness that
federal bank regulators have long possessed.72
The new Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(“HERA”) became law less than two months before Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac failed.73 Ultimately the two GSEs were not
well-served by their tradition of selecting politically capable
CEOs who could fend off the kind of supervision that a more
capable regulator might have been able to provide.74
Because of their government backing and low capital
requirements in their charters, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
gained immense market power.75 They doubled in size every five
76
years or so until their failure in 2008, when the two companies
had funded over $5 trillion of mortgages—over 40 percent of the
mortgage market.77
Their market power gave them political power. Whenever
someone would urge regulatory reform, such as higher capital
standards to reduce the GSEs’ dangerous leverage, huge
numbers of constituents could be expected to flood Capitol
Hill.78 In turn, that political power further entrenched the GSEs’
72

To give but one example, the new law required the new regulator to
conduct an estimated 25–30 rulemakings, often with short deadlines, to
implement key provisions of the act. The bank regulators have discretion in
many of the areas where HERA sought to impose inflexibility upon the
FHFA through required rulemakings.
73
President Bush signed HERA into law on July 30, 2008; Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac went into conservatorship on September 7, 2008.
74
See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note
27, at 844 (“What does effective accountability mean? First, feedback is
essential for effective operations . . . . Many examples exist, in both the
private and public sectors, of how too much autonomy can lead to subsequent
failure.”).
75
STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 70–75.
76
See, e.g., figures presented in STANTON, supra note 5, at 4.
77
See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, A History of Public Aid During Crises,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at A27.
78
Observers have long noted this pattern. David A. Vise, The Money
Machine: How Fannie Mae Wields Power, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1995, at
A14 (“Builders, real estate brokers and bankers across the country rely so
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market power.
The failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shows the
shortcomings of the GSE as an organizational model. However
sound the accountability structure may be when the organization
begins, the incentive to satisfy private owners will lead a GSE to
try to weaken safety and soundness oversight and reduce capital
standards. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac arguably had
more effective accountability structures when they were
chartered as GSEs than when they were supervised by OFHEO.
Between 1968 and 1992, when OFHEO was established, both
companies had successfully removed government controls that
they considered unacceptable.79
In short, the drive to satisfy shareholders is intense and can
easily overwhelm considerations for the financial system, the
housing system, and American taxpayers.
III. EVALUATING THE GSE AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
A. Four Criteria Help to Evaluate Organizations That Carry
Out Public Purposes: Capacity, Flexibility,
Accountability, and Life-Cycle
Four criteria are helpful in evaluating the quality of
government agencies and instrumentalities that carry out public
purposes:80
heavily on Fannie Mae for mortgage funds that they live in fear of offending
the firm and routinely defend it in Washington.”).
79
For example, when Freddie Mac was chartered as a GSE in 1970 its
board of directors consisted of three federal officials rather than a
shareholder-controlled board; when Fannie Mae was chartered in 1968 its
charter contained provisions permitting the HUD Secretary to fix the
capitalization of the GSE at 6.6 percent, significantly higher than the 2.5
percent permitted by the 1992 Act.
80
See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable
Government: A Guide to Organizational Design, in MEETING THE
CHALLENGE OF 9/11: BLUEPRINTS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 25
(2006) [hereinafter Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government];
Thomas H. Stanton, The Administration of Medicare, 60 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1373 (2003) [hereinafter Stanton, Administration of Medicare].
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Capacity: What is the capacity of the organization, in
terms of people, administrative budget, systems, and
organization, to carry out its public purposes?
Flexibility: What flexibility does the organization have,
under the law and in practice, to carry out its public
purposes?
Accountability: How well is the organization held
accountable for (1) carrying out its public purposes, and
(2) its stewardship of public resources?
Life Cycle: As the organization matures, what strengths
and shortcomings manifest themselves?
For different organizations, different measures will become
more critical than others in understanding strengths and
weaknesses. As a general rule, to the extent that weaknesses
appear, government agencies may have difficulty with the
measures of capacity and flexibility, while privately owned
instrumentalities may have difficulty with accountability.81
Numerous organizations of all types have difficulty with lifecycle, and the ability to remain active, focused, and useful over
many years.82
Government-sponsored enterprises are privately owned
institutions free from the budgetary and other constraints
imposed on government agencies.83 As such, they tend to
develop significant capacity and flexibility compared to
government agencies that serve the same economic sector.84 A
comparison of mortgage operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, on the one hand, and the Federal Housing Administration

81

Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government, supra note 80, at
25; Stanton, Administration of Medicare, supra note 80.
82
Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government, supra note 80, at
25; Stanton, Administration of Medicare, supra note 80.
83
Thomas H. Stanton & Ronald C. Moe, Government Corporations and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, in TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO
THE NEW GOVERNANCE 85 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) [hereinafter
Stanton & Moe] (“Indeed, GSEs can, and usually do, become virtually
autonomous from the government that charters them.”).
84
Stanton, Reducing Government Involvement, supra note 7.
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(FHA), on the other, displays this pattern. While Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac were able to dedicate substantial resources to
building their automated underwriting and other mortgagerelated systems, the federal budget process has constrained FHA
from making similar needed investments even though they are
essential to the future success of the agency.85
On the other hand, the issue of accountability is salient for
GSEs, and for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in particular. As
private companies operating with substantial government
subsidies, GSEs often grow to dominate their markets.86 Market
power leads to political power,87 which in turn leads to favorable
changes to the GSE’s charter that help expand its market power
and reduce the effectiveness of any accountability framework
government may seek to apply to the GSEs.
Finally, the issue of life cycle is also important for the
GSEs. The rapid growth of GSEs combined with their ability to
dominate their government regulator and other accountability
measures and avoid being required to adopt prudent capital
standards can lead to flawed business decisions.88 The current
crisis in the mortgage market highlights problems of GSE
accountability and life cycle with special force.
B. GSE Vulnerabilities Will Not Disappear Merely by
Changing Regulation or Governance
Proposals to craft special rules such as regulating the GSEs
as public utilities89 or limiting them to cooperative ownership90
85

Steve Preston, Secretary, HUD, Prepared Remarks at the National
Press Club (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/speeches/
2008-11-19.cfm.
86
STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 3 (“Thanks to
their special government benefits, GSEs have grown rapidly to dominate
many market segments, especially in housing (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
the Federal Home Loan Banks) and student loans (Sallie Mae).”).
87
See supra note 78.
88
See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note
27.
89
See, e.g., Steven Sloan & Emily Flitter, Paulson’s Third Way: GSEs
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will not overcome the vulnerabilities of the GSE as an
institutional form that is based on political dominance. Such
proposals to create a different accountability framework or
governance structure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not
change the assessment of the GSE’s organizational form. Most
importantly, the issue of political dominance of the GSEs over
their regulators, and GSE influence over their congressional
authorizing committees, would not go away even if these
changes were actually implemented.
Some have suggested that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can
be regulated as public utilities. This suggestion has several
defects. First, utility regulation is designed to address the
problem that public utilities benefit from scale economies that
may give them characteristics of monopolies;91 price regulation
by a public utility commission seeks to prevent a public utility
from imposing monopoly pricing on its customers.92
In other words, rather than limiting the size of a public
utility, government accepts a utility’s dominant market position
and seeks to limit the high prices that could result. But taxpayers
are at risk if the GSEs grow to hold a dominant position in the
mortgage market.93 The need to control monopoly pricing is not

Taking Utility Role, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 2009. The public utility model is
described in R. S. Seiler, Jr., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as InvestorOwned Utilities, 11 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 117 (1999).
90
At the time of this writing, such proposals are circulating informally
among federal agencies and stakeholder groups.
91
Seiler, supra note 89, at 121, 124 (“[T]he utility industries have
generally exhibited economies of scale . . . . The superior technology and
monopoly franchise of a traditional utility gives the firm considerable market
power.”).
92
Id. at 124 (“[W]hen only one firm is allowed to serve a market, the
company has an incentive to set prices above marginal cost, restrict output,
and engage in price discrimination, in order to earn monopoly profits. To
limit these incentives, governments traditionally imposed limits on the rates
of return that utilities could earn and required that their rate structures be fair
and equitable.”).
93
Stanton, supra note 27, at 840 (“As the GSEs have grown Treasury
Secretary John Snow, Comptroller General David M. Walker, Congressional
Budget Office Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Federal Reserve Chairmen
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as much a concern for today’s taxpayers as is the need to limit
the size of GSEs and their accompanying financial risks. The
public utility model, with its focus on price regulation, is not
relevant to that problem. Indeed, a regulator with authority to
supervise pricing could potentially decide to permit a GSE to
charge high prices as a way to build a strong capital cushion.94
Secondly, regulated companies too often capture their
regulators.95 As political scientist Marver Bernstein noted,
regulatory commissions are frequently dominated by the interests
that they are supposed to regulate.96 Thus, under any new
regulatory scheme, the GSEs would simply shift the application
of their political power from domination of their past regulators
to the new public utility regulator.
Third, the creation of a separate utility-type regulator for the
GSEs would not combine GSE
supervision with the
responsibilities of a regulator that supervises banks and thrifts as
Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke have warned about the possibility of
financial failure at a GSE spreading to the many holders of GSE obligations
such as commercial banks and foreign central banks. This is what is known
as systemic risk, which is the possibility that a failure at one institution
causes market turmoil that spreads to other institutions in the financial
system, with potentially serious effects for the performance of the U.S.
economy.”).
94
This is similar to the position of Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by
the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007 5 (Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta Conference Paper, 2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/
news/CONFEREN/09fmc/gorton.pdf (creating a stable banking structure
“will require that a valuable charter be recreated for firms that are deemed
‘banks’”).
95
See, e.g., Willem H. Buiter, Lessons from the North Atlantic Financial
Crisis 36–38 (May 28, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.
org/research/conference/2008/rmm/buiter.pdf
(paper
prepared
for
presentation at the conference “The Role of Money Markets” jointly
organized by Columbia Business School and the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York on May 29–30, 2008).
96
MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 92 (1955) (“During old age the working agreement that a
commission reaches with the regulated interests becomes so fixed that the
regulatory agency has no creative force left to mobilize against the regulated
groups.”).
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well as GSEs. Rather, it would encourage the preferential capital
and supervisory requirements that lie at the core of GSE
financial vulnerability.97
In short, application of a public utility model to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac would perpetuate many of the vulnerabilities
and large-scale risks of the GSE model that lie at the root of
their failure in 2008.
Another idea being discussed informally, though not yet
published in a formal treatment, is to change the governance
structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so that they would be
owned and controlled by companies that do business with
them—a cooperative structure. The cooperative governance
structure also fails to add quality to the GSE model. This was
seen among the GSEs in the financial failure of the Farm Credit
System in the mid-1980s and the troubled financial condition of
the Federal Home Loan Banks today.98 While the investor-owned
GSE seeks to increase risk to serve its investor owners, the
cooperative GSE has an incentive to serve the cooperative
owners who use its services.99 That incentive led the Farm
97

See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Government Sponsored Enterprises
(GSEs): Why is Effective Government Supervision Hard to Achieve?,
Address to the 37th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (May 10, 2001) (“ . . . (1) the government
subsidy allows GSEs to expand and increase their risk-taking without facing
the market discipline that constrains other companies; (2) the GSEs have both
incentive and ability to influence or dominate the political process; and (3)
the unusual legal structure of GSEs involves complexities that policymakers
may not fully understand. This paper contends that all of these factors make
government supervision difficult, if not impossible.”).
98
Steven Sloan, Insurance Fund for FHLBs is on the Table: Idea Could
Help Instill Confidence, Provide Backstop, AM. BANKER, June 3, 2009, at 1
(“As the Federal Home Loan banks continue to struggle with charges on their
mortgage holdings, the Federal Housing Finance Agency is considering the
creation of an insurance fund that could absorb losses at a troubled Home
Loan bank.”).
99
See, e.g., Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government, supra
note 80, at 75 (“For the cooperative, governance by a board of directors
means attention to the needs of the owners that use the cooperative’s services.
Thus, a cooperative such as the Farm Credit System in the past showed a
tendency to underprice its services . . . .”).
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Credit System to provide credit to its cooperative borrowers
below the GSE’s own cost of funds.100 Such an approach was not
sustainable and led to the system declaring insolvency in the
mid-1980s. The experience of the cooperative GSEs shows that
turning Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into cooperatives would
not reduce their incentives or capacity to dominate the GSE
regulator and avoid prudential requirements such as bank-type
capital standards.
IV. WHAT TO DO WITH THE GSES NOW THAT THEY ARE IN
GOVERNMENT HANDS
As instruments of government policy,101 the future of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac should depend on the amount and kind of
support that the markets actually need. More substantial
government support is needed in the next few years, as the
effects of the collapsing housing credit bubble make themselves
felt in a weakened mortgage market, rather than in five years or
so, when the housing markets have returned to greater strength
and stability.
A. The Government Should Place Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac into Receivership
The government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
conservatorship rather than receivership. Unlike receivership,
the voluntary acceptance of conservatorship by Fannie Mae or
102
Freddie Mac was not subject to litigation, which could have
100

Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 27, at
421–23.
101
Political scientist Lester Salamon considers the GSEs to be what he
calls “tools of government.” A GSE, although not a government agency or
other part of the formal government, is a tool of government that helps to
carry out public purposes. See Stanton & Moe, supra note 83.
102
Section 1369(b)(4) (“Appointment of Conservators”) of the 1992 Act
provides that “[a]ppointment of a conservator pursuant to consent of the
enterprise under subsection (a)(2) shall not be subject to judicial review under
this subsection.” Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4619(b)(2)(2008).
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further troubled the financial markets at a difficult time.
Placing a failed financial institution directly into
conservatorship violates the customary practice of the federal
bank and thrift regulators who first place an institution into
receivership, then separate the assets into a “good-bank/badbank” structure and send the good bank, cleaned out of troubled
assets, into conservatorship or bridge-bank status.103 Placing an
institution into receivership removes the shareholders of the
defunct institution. Thus, when IndyMac, a large thrift
institution with over $32 billion in assets, failed,104 it was placed
into receivership.105 The receiver then transferred the deposits
and most of the assets to a newly chartered thrift, IndyMac
Federal Bank,106 with the FDIC as conservator.107
It is now time to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
receivership. As past losses materialize and are recognized by
the two GSEs, it is clear that both institutions have lost much
more than their entire net worth.108 Placing both companies into
103

Appointment of a receiver for an insolvent bank or thrift institution
with federally insured deposits is required under conditions specified in 12
U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3)(C) (2008). Authority to establish a bridge bank is
found in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m)(2008).
104
Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Establishes IndyMac
Fed. Bank, FSB as Successor to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Pasadena, Cal. (July
11, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08056.
html.
105
See, e.g., Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO) Report to the Board,
Executive Summary Third Quarter 2008, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., available
at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/corporate/cfo_report_3rdqtr_08/exec_
summary.html (“During the third quarter of 2008, the FDIC was named
receiver for . . . IndyMac Bank of Pasadena, California.”).
106
Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., A Review of
Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts Before the Fin. Servs. Comm. U.S. House of
Representatives (Sep. 17, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spsep1708.html (“As the Committee
knows, the former IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Pasadena, California, was closed
July 11. The FDIC is conservator for a new institution, IndyMac Federal
Bank, F.S.B. (IndyMac Federal), to which the accounts and assets of the
former IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. were transferred.”).
107
Id.
108
Fannie Mae Seeks $10.7B in US Aid After 2Q Loss, N.Y. TIMES,
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receivership will help to remove an inherent conflict in the
government’s position. Technically, conservatorship means that
the government is working to restore the companies to financial
health;109 the government has preserved the shareholders in the
two companies and allowed their stock to trade freely. This is
inconsistent with key aspects of the government’s need to use
the two companies to support the mortgage market, now that the
value of the holdings of private shareholders in the companies is
zero.110 Until shareholders are removed from the equation,
officers and directors of the two companies will be conflicted as
to their fiduciary responsibilities. Do they price mortgage
purchases low to support the market or do they price higher to
111
The two
replenish the companies’ shareholder value?
companies and their managers appear to be caught in the strong
contradiction between their obligations to serve their remaining
shareholders and the needs of the housing market.112
If the government placed both companies into receivership,
Aug. 7, 2009, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/fannie-maeseeks-107-billion-in-aid-after-loss/?scp=1&sq=fannie&st=cse
(“Fannie
Mae’s new request for $10.7 billion from the Treasury Department will bring
the total for Fannie and Freddie to nearly $96 billion.”).
109
“The FHFA, as Conservator, may take all actions necessary and
appropriate to (1) put the Company in a sound and solvent condition and (2)
carry on the Company’s business and preserve and conserve the assets and
property of the Company.” FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, FACT
SHEET: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON CONSERVATORSHIP 2 (2008),
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/35/FHFACONSERVQA.pdf.
110
Kopecki, supra note 3.
111
The two companies themselves complain of the conflict in their roles
in conservatorship. See Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 7
(Sept. 30, 2008); Freddie Mac, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 5 (Sept.
30, 2008).
112
Zachary A. Goldfarb, Government-Picked Leader Resigns as Losses
Pile Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at D01 (“The government-appointed
chief executive of Freddie Mac announced yesterday that he is stepping
down . . . . David M. Moffett’s resignation comes amid growing losses at
the McLean mortgage-finance company and unresolved questions about
whether it should follow the path of a private firm trying to make its way
back to profitability or that of a government agency whose overriding goal is
carrying out public policy.”).
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then it could use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as agents of
reform for the mortgage market.113
B. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Should Not Again
Become GSEs
To best support the mortgage market, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac should not again become privately owned
organizations that operate with federal backing.
For many reasons, it is important to now end the GSE status
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. First, the GSEs have now
squandered a policy tool that government had used for decades:
the perception of an implicit rather than explicit federal
guarantee of their debt obligations.114 That means that
government would need to provide some form of express
guarantee if the GSEs were to be restored; providing an express
government guarantee to only two companies, or even a few
companies, would raise fundamental issues of fairness. Second,
as was seen in the savings and loan debacle115 and now with the
GSEs,116 the government has great difficulty managing the risks
when it insures the liabilities of a specialized financial
institution. If policymakers want to support the mortgage
113

For examples of government corporations successfully helping to
address the consequences of earlier crises, see MARK K. CASSELL & SUSAN
M. HOFFMAN, IBM CENTER FOR THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT, MANAGING
A $700 BILLION BAILOUT: LESSONS FROM THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN
CORPORATION (2009), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/Cassell
Report.pdf.
114
Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6, at 636 (“ . . . the
Treasury’s infusion of capital starting on September 7, 2008, creates the
perception of an explicit federal guarantee for the GSEs.”).
115
See, e.g., R. DAN BRUMBAUGH, JR., THRIFTS UNDER SIEGE at 179
(1988) (“Now, economic volatility and widespread information distribution
are facts of life, and exogenous and endogenous economic volatility for thrifts
and banks are rendering deposit insurance, with its implicit taxpayer burden,
and balance-sheet regulation increasingly untenable.”).
116
See, e.g., STANTON, A STATE OF RISK, supra note 39, at 8–12
(comparing the institutional characteristics of savings and loan associations
(S&Ls) with GSEs).
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market, they should authorize government guarantees of
mortgages, or at most, mortgage-backed securities.
Third, the government should not provide special charters to
a limited number of specialized institutions. As the GSEs have
shown, it is virtually impossible to protect the regulator of a few
private institutions from being dominated.117 This is especially
true if the regulated institutions operate under a law such as
HERA,118 which provides for different rules, especially for
capital, but also for other aspects of safety and soundness, than
those applicable to other institutions in the same lines of
business.119 Fourth, proposals to craft special rules such as trying
to regulate the GSEs as public utilities or by limiting them to
cooperative ownership will not overcome the vulnerabilities of
the GSE as an institutional form that is based on political
dominance. Consider each of these issues in turn.
1. The End of the Implicit Government
Guarantee of GSE Obligations
In earlier years, government was careful to preserve the
option that it would decline to bail out holders of GSE
obligations and GSE-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities.120
117

See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
ENTERPRISES: A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO
RISKS, GAO/GGD-91-90, May 1991, at 45 (“We also believe a regulator that
oversees a single regulated entity may have difficulty remaining at arm’s
length from that entity.”).
118
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
(2008).
119
For example, a federal financial regulator needs discretion to set and
adjust capital standards according to events as they occur. Compare the
rulemaking requirements of HERA, section 1111(d)(3), with the much more
flexible authority of the federal bank regulators at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3907(a)(2)(2008) (“Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall have the
authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a banking institution
as the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, deems to be
necessary or appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the
banking institution.”).
120
Thus, the Fannie Mae Charter Act contains a requirement that:
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Government officials regularly used careful language indicating
that the government’s involvement merely created the perception
of an implicit guarantee rather than an actual guarantee.121 These
niceties began to erode with the financial rescue of the failed
Farm Credit System in the mid-1980s and the government’s rush
to support obligations of the Financing Corporation (FICO) in
1996.122 With the government support of holders of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac debt obligations and mortgage-backedsecurities as part of the government’s rescue of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008, the perception of implicit
government backing of GSEs has become an anachronism.123
One consequence of the destruction of the implicit guarantee is
that in the future, government will be required to provide either
an express guarantee, backed by the full-faith and credit of the
United States, or none at all. Another consequence is that,
unlike the former implicit federal guarantee, explicit government
guarantees are included in the federal budget. Thus, the Office
The corporation shall insert appropriate language in all of its
obligations issued under this subsection clearly indicating that such
obligations, together with the interest thereon, are not guaranteed by
the United States and do not constitute a debt or obligation of the
United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof other than the
corporation.
12 U.S.C. § 1719(b) (2008). The corresponding Freddie Mac Charter
provision is found at 12 U.S.C. § 1455(h)(2) (2008).
121
See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES:
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SEVERING GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP, GGD-96-120,
May 1996, at 25 (“The most important benefit that the enterprises receive
from their government-sponsored status, however, is an implicit one
stemming from investors’ perception that the federal government would not
allow the enterprises to default on their obligations.”).
122
On the former, see, STANTON, A STATE OF RISK, supra note 39, at
124. On the latter see, e.g., Associated Press, House Panel Backs Rescue of
S & L. Fund, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/
07/26/business/house-panel-backs-rescue-of-s-l-fund.html?scp=55&sq=%22
financing+corporation%22&st=nyt&pagewanted=print.
The
Financing
Corporation is authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1441 (2008).
123
Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6, at 636 (“ . . . the
Treasury’s infusion of capital starting on September 7, 2008, creates the
perception of an explicit federal guarantee for the GSEs.”).
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of Management and Budget (OMB) (which administers
budgeting for credit programs for the Executive Branch),124 is
likely to score borrowing by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (or
their successor organizations performing similar functions) as a
part of credit reform, comparable to the budget treatment of
financial guarantees issued by Ginnie Mae (a wholly owned
government corporation located in the Department of Housing
and Urban Development that guarantees mortgage-backed
securities insured or guaranteed by FHA or other government
agencies).125 The days of the GSE as a source of an off-budget
government subsidy for housing finance are coming to an end.
2. The Risks of Insuring Liabilities of
Specialized Financial Institutions
As periodic failures of federal guarantee programs have
shown,126 the government can, and sometimes does, lose the
capacity to supervise use of its financial guarantee. Losses occur
when a federal program incurs defaults on loans that an agency
guarantees, or on direct loans that an agency provides.127 For

124

OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR NO. A-129, POLICIES FOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS AND NONTAX RECEIVABLES (2000).
125
Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association, was
chartered in 1968 as a wholly owned government corporation at the time that
Fannie Mae was chartered as a GSE. Both organizations are successors to the
original Federal National Mortgage Association that until 1968 was a wholly
owned government corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (2008).
126
See generally, LEONARD DOWNIE, JR., MORTGAGE ON AMERICA 143
(Praeger Publishers 1974) (discussing the failure of HUD single-family and
multifamily programs in the early 1970s).
127
Credit budgeting requires a calculation of the so-called credit
subsidy, i.e., the budgetary outlays that will be required to fund new
loans or loan guarantees that the government provides each fiscal
year. Credit reform recognizes that a loan’s true cost is . . . the net
value of its cash flows over the life of the loan. This value is the
loan’s “subsidy cost”, [sic] which is the net present value of a loan’s
expected cash inflows and outflows over the life of the loan. For
example, if the estimated present value of a direct loan’s cash
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example, the FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance program128
currently would seem to be especially at risk of incurring high
rates of defaults on mortgages that the FHA insures.129
However, a guarantee of assets rather than liabilities has
several advantages for the government and taxpayers. First,
asset guarantees are subject to oversight through the federal
budget and the application of credit budgeting.130 This allows the
Office of Management and Budget to monitor the risks involved
in extending the guarantee and to provide regular feedback to
the agency and program through the annual process of reestimating the budgetary costs.131
Such supervision and discipline is lacking for federal

outflows equals $100 and the present value of its inflows equals $90,
its subsidy cost is $10 and its subsidy rate is 10 percent. If an
agency proposed to make $2,000 of these loans, it would seek an
appropriation of 10 percent of the desired face value, or $200.
Budgeting for loan programs with this present value-based
accounting system represented a significant departure for the
otherwise cash-based Federal budget.
THOMAS H. STANTON, Loans and Loan Guarantees, in TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 384.
128
The FHA program is explained on the HUD website. HUD, Federal
Housing Administration, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last
visited Aug. 10, 2009) (“The Federal Housing Administration, generally
known as ‘FHA’, [sic] provides mortgage insurance on loans made by FHAapproved lenders throughout the United States and its territories. FHA
insures mortgages on single family and multifamily homes including
manufactured homes and hospitals. It is the largest insurer of mortgages in
the world, insuring over 34 million properties since its inception in 1934.”).
129
See, e.g., Preston, supra note 85; Barry Meier, As FHA’s Role
Grows, So Does the Risk of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008.
130
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
131
The Office of Management and Budget annually estimates the risk of
each federal credit program and the amount of subsidy that would need to be
provided to offset the risk of loans and loan guarantees originated during the
year. For data on credit programs for the most recent Fiscal Year, see
Federal Credit Supplement: Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year
2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/
cr_supp.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
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programs that guarantee liabilities rather than financial assets.132
Thus, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has
been able to guarantee hundreds of billions of dollars of debt in
response to the financial crisis, including obligations of troubled
institutions such as Citigroup and Bank of America, without
being accountable through the federal budget.133 Similarly,
guarantees of corporate pension plan liabilities by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) are not subject to
budget constraints.134
Second, it is less difficult to monitor the risks inherent in a
guarantee of assets than in a guarantee of liabilities. For a
guarantee of assets, the government must monitor the quality of
origination, servicing, and collections, and the credit quality of
the assets themselves.135 By contrast, monitoring a guarantee of
liabilities of a financial institution involves trying to assess the
quality of the institution’s management, its capitalization, its
accounting practices, and many other potential sources of risk
besides the quality of its assets.
Third, as was seen most clearly in the savings and loan

132

F. Stevens Redburn, How Should the Government Measure Spending?
The Uses of Accrual Accounting, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 228 (1993).
133
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2009 69 (2008). The “Credit and Insurance” chapter is
instructive when one compares budget treatment of credit programs, including
direct loans and federal guarantees of financial assets, with guarantees of
liabilities such as the FDIC guarantee of obligations of insolvent financial
institutions.
134
Estimated losses on guarantees by the PBGC were estimated at $47
billion. Again, the Analytical Perspectives “Credit and Insurance” chapter is
instructive when one compares budget treatment of credit programs, including
direct loans and federal guarantees of financial assets, with guarantees of
liabilities by the PBGC. See id. The law states that liabilities of the PBGC
are not backed by the United States. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2) (2008) (“The
United States is not liable for any obligation or liability incurred by the
corporation.”). As with the backing of GSE obligations that the GSEs
disavow in their loan documentation, no one believes this. See supra note
120.
135
Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6.
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debacle, a federal guarantee of an institution’s liabilities creates
adverse incentives. When the government guarantees obligations
of a financial firm through deposit insurance, for example,
insured depositors lose incentive to monitor the safety and
soundness of the institution to which they are lending money
when they make a deposit. Unless the government supervises
them closely, owners of such a financial institution, can in turn,
take much greater risks than if investors were more vigilant in
their obligations. This can greatly compound the government’s
risk exposure, compared to the actual volume of liabilities that
government believes it is guaranteeing.136 By contrast, when
government guarantees financial assets or even pools of financial
assets, it can provide for risk sharing that, at least in principle,
can reduce the government’s potential losses.
For all of these reasons, if government can avoid
guaranteeing the liabilities of a private institution, it should do
so. In the case of providing support for the residential mortgage
market, this conclusion is bolstered by the fact that federal
mortgage insurance, or perhaps a federal guarantee of pools of
mortgages, with appropriate risk-sharing with the loan
originator, can provide needed support for the mortgage market
without incurring the risks involved in trying to guarantee the
liabilities of a GSE.137 It also seems prudent that the future
structure of housing finance must take account of the difficulty
that both public and private sector managers can have in trying
to manage a large volume of assets and mortgage-backed
securities.

136

For example, that was the case with the savings and loan debacle.
See, e.g., BRUMBAUGH, supra note 115; STANTON, A STATE OF RISK, supra
note 39, at 8–12.
137
See, e.g., Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6, at 636
(“The benefit of this option is that it cleanly removes shareholders and
current management from the equation and allows the government to pump
federally backed funds into the mortgage market on a prudent basis.”).

STANTON 2D REVISION.DOC

5/8/2010 4:06 PM

FAILURE OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC

253

3. Special Charters and the Problem
of Regulatory Capture
Regulatory capture is a major problem for federal regulators
in many parts of the economy.138 The problem is especially acute
for a regulator of only a few institutions. Such a regulator can
be expected to assume a parochial point of view compared to a
regulator with responsibility for supervising a plethora of
institutions with varying interests and perspectives.139
The problem becomes especially acute for institutions such
as GSEs that fall into a hybrid category between other
organizational types.140 Take, for example, the issue of
appropriate capital standards: should GSE capital standards be
set according to bank-type standards or according to the
standards that state regulators apply to private mortgage-backed
securities conduits? Economist Willem Buiter argues that what
he calls “cognitive regulatory capture” can bring financial

138

See BERNSTEIN, supra note 96, at 295 (“By insulating themselves
from popular political forces, the commissions have subjected themselves to
undue influence from the regulated groups and tend to become protective
spokesmen for the industries which they regulate.”); see also Buiter, supra
note 95, at 36–41 (showing the power of what he calls “cognitive regulatory
capture”).
139
The GAO has made similar observations and earlier recommended
that all of the GSEs be supervised by a single high-level regulator:
Because of its important responsibility to supervise the safety and
soundness of all the enterprises, the members of the independent
regulator’s board need to have sufficient status, respect in
government and business, and financial expertise. GAO proposes a
three-member board composed of a full-time chairperson who acts as
the chief executive officer of the regulatory staff, the Secretary of
the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System.
CHARLES BOWSHER, GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:
A
FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO RISKS GAO/GGD91–90, May 1991, at 8. This recommendation failed to be adopted, in part
because it could have placed congressional jurisdiction over the regulator into
a broad-based committee such as the House Ways and Means Committee
rather than in the hands of the GSE authorizing committees.
140
STANTON, supra note 5, at 1.
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regulators into the cognitive mindset of the institutions that they
regulate.141 Cognitive capture is not a product of corruption, but
rather a process by which the regulator or relevant congressional
actors internalize “as if by osmosis, the objectives, interests, and
perception of reality of the vested interests they are meant to
regulate and supervise . . . .”142 The dynamic of Buiter’s
cognitive regulatory capture means that over time, a regulator
can grow to favor the institutions that it regulates. Thus, a
regulator with responsibility for supervising only the housing
GSEs under a statute with a unique statement of capital
requirements compared to other financial institutions, can gain
motivation to move towards lower capital standards.143 This
opens the door to regulatory arbitrage and the likelihood that the
GSEs once again would resume their excessive growth, based on
their regulatory advantages rather than on whether it makes
sense to concentrate so much risk in a few specialized financial
institutions.
The inability of the Congress to set bank-type capital
standards for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or to create for them
a supervisory framework that was at least as strong as the
supervisory framework for banks,144 stands as a warning of the
political dynamics that are at play here. As specialized
institutions,145 GSEs tend to be the province of parochial
141

Buiter, supra note 95, at 37.
Id.
143
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. In contrast to HERA,
which maintains a distinct statutory framework for the GSEs, there are now
consolidated statutory requirements for the bank and thrift regulators. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, as amended, in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(q) (2008) defines “Appropriate Federal Banking Agency” to include
the Office of Thrift Supervision (the thrift regulator) as well as the bank
regulators and, in 12 U.S.C § 1818 (2008), grants common supervisory
authority and imposes common responsibility upon each “appropriate federal
banking agency” to apply remedies to deal with troubled institutions that are
under their supervision.
144
See Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6, at 634–35.
145
See, e.g., STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 8
(“Like thrifts, government-sponsored enterprises are specialized lenders. In
return for their statutory benefits they are limited by law to serving
142
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committees or subcommittees of the Congress that are attuned to
the benefits of GSEs for the stakeholders whom they serve, and
are relatively insensitive to the need to protect ordinary
taxpayers from having to pay for an expensive rescue.146
The prospect of differential capital and other supervisory
requirements that permit regulatory arbitrage means that GSEs
again can evolve to become not only “too big to fail,” but also
too big to succeed.147 The failure of internal controls at both
GSEs was revealed at Freddie Mac in 2003 and at Fannie Mae
in 2004,148 when they were much smaller than they were when
they failed completely several years later. More recently, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac have shown, at great cost to the
residential mortgage market and larger financial system, that the
GSEs and their politically oriented managers lack the ability to
manage such large institutions.
One should not ignore the fact that many other kinds of
financial institutions, including banks, thrifts, and investment
banks and their holding companies also failed in the recent
debacle. The point here is that the GSE can be replaced by a
wholly owned government corporation to provide comparable

prescribed kinds of borrowers or dealing in specified kinds of loans.”).
146
Thus, when considering whether to create the first safety-andsoundness regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (which became
OFHEO in 1992), members of the House Banking Committee joked about
whether the legislation was necessary. Asked one Representative, “I’m just
not sure exactly what we’re doing . . . . I still want to know what basic
problem we’re attempting to fix.” Answered another, “Palpitations in the
Treasury Department, cause unknown.” Jill Zuckman, Bills To Increase GSE
Oversight Move Ahead in House, Senate, CONG. Q., Aug. 3, 1991, at 21–39.
147
See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL:
THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 26 (Brookings Institution Press 2004)
(defining institutions that are too big to fail as so large, complex, or
intertwined with the rest of the financial system that policymakers support the
institution’s uninsured creditors—despite having no legal obligation to do so—
for fear that the institution’s failure could cause an unacceptable amount of
damage to other institutions and the larger financial system. Economic costs
accrue “when weak market discipline associated with too big to fail induces
banks to make suboptimal decisions.”).
148
Stanton, supra note 27, at 840–42.
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support to the mortgage market without incurring the political
and financial risks inherent in the GSE’s hybrid organizational
form.
C. The Government Should Turn Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac into Wholly Owned Government Corporations
The government should promptly end Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac as investor-owned companies with perceived
federal backing and turn them into wholly owned government
corporations.149 At some specified time—say five years from
now, when the mortgage market stabilizes once again—
policymakers can decide the extent to which government support
for the secondary mortgage market would be useful or
affordable.
The wholly owned government corporation is a special type
of government agency that is intended to operate in a
businesslike way.150 Government corporations are supposed to be
financially self-sustaining, or at least potentially self-sustaining.
They keep their books similar to a private firm and submit
business-type budgets rather than government budgets each year.
The idea of a government corporation is that it should seek to
fund itself from its operations. If Congress decides to add
noneconomic programs to a government corporation charter,
then it should appropriate money to enable the government
corporation to carry out these activities.
In the current environment, when many people express
concerns about the large size of government, it is helpful to
remember that GSEs combine the involvement of government
with the incentives of private owners to create a much larger,
and economically more distorting, presence in the mortgage
149

Government Corporation Control Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 9101 (2008)
(defining the contours of the term “wholly owned government corporation”).
150
See, e.g., Stanton & Moe, supra note 83, at 81; Office of
Management and Budget, Memorandum on Government Corporations, M-9605, at 3 (Dec. 8, 1995); U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Government Corporations: Profiles of Existing Government Corporations,
GGD-96-14, at 5 (1995).
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market than occurs if a government corporation were quietly
serving its mission without the drive to constant expansion that
systematically occurs with any GSE.151
Transformed into government corporations, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac could carry out significant activities during the next
five years. They could:
1. Lower the cost of mortgages to help consumers
refinance out of adjustable rate and other kinds of
mortgages that are proving difficult for many
homeowners to repay.
2. Serve as vehicles to deliver improved federal support
for homeowners who are forced into foreclosure by
losing their jobs.
3. Provide essential consumer protections for borrowers,
such as Alex Pollock’s one-page mortgage disclosure
form.152
4. Devise and impose requirements that primary lenders
and other participants in the mortgage process have
appropriate
financial
strength
and
capability,
accountability, and that they engage in appropriate risksharing before they are allowed to do business with the
two companies. Implementation of some of these
requirements may need to be deferred until the housing
and mortgage markets regain some semblance of
stability.
5. Adapt their Automated Underwriting Systems, and
perhaps other systems and capabilities, for use by other
federal agencies, starting with the FHA, and perhaps
Ginnie Mae and the direct loan program for homeowners
(part of the disaster loan program) of the Small Business
151

See, e.g., Stanton & Moe, supra note 83, at 82; see also STANTON,
MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 4–6, (showing statistics of how
all of the GSEs, whether investor-owned or cooperatives, virtually doubled in
size every five years).
152
ALEX POLLOCK, THE BASIC FACTS ABOUT YOUR MORTGAGE LOAN
(American Enterprise Institute 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20070913_20070515_PollockPrototype.pdf.
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Administration.153
In short, the government could turn the collapse of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac into an opportunity to fashion important
rules of conduct for those types of participants in the housing
market that have served American consumers and taxpayers so
poorly. The government also could use the GSEs to help shore
up the FHA by providing technical and IT systems support.
Once they become wholly owned government corporations
without the need to serve a mix of public and private objectives,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could play major roles in
supporting the housing market.
Congress would be well advised to place a sunset provision
of perhaps five years into each government corporation charter.
A sunset date, which formally would terminate the corporation
charter and require an end to its operations, provides an
opportunity for policymakers to determine whether the enabling
legislation should be reauthorized and, if so, in what form. As
the sunset approaches, and the mortgage debacle is hopefully
behind us, policymakers can decide whether further support for
the mortgage market is required, and which organizational form
is most suitable.
If they decided to wind up two government corporations at
the end of five years, policymakers would address both the
capacity and the life-cycle disadvantages that can otherwise
accompany the creation of wholly owned government
corporations. Having a five year sunset period would allow the
wholly owned government corporations to provide support for
154
the mortgage market at a critical time. The experience of the
Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) indicates how a
temporary government corporation can develop the capacity to
153

Thomas H. Stanton, Strengthening Government’s Ability to Deal With
the Financial Crisis IBM CENTER FOR THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT (2009)
[hereinafter Stanton, Strengthening Government’s Ability], at 13, available at
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/StantonFinancial.pdf. (discussing
FHA’s need for enhanced capacity).
154
As GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2009 fund almost three
quarters of new residential mortgage originations. See, e.g., Lockhart, supra
note 19, at 10.
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deal with complex financial issues. It does this by attracting
high-quality talent that might not contemplate a longer term
career in government.155 The RTC was impressive in the way
that it evolved constant improvements in its approach to its
mission.156
Even though the Congress could allow one or both of the
government corporations to sunset at the end of their charter
terms, this is not a foregone conclusion. The continuation of a
government corporation could appeal to some policymakers, for
example because of the ability to use revenues from mortgage
operations to support affordable housing.157
In 1996, the General Accounting Office undertook a study to
examine the consequences for the housing market if Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac ceased to operate as firms with any
government backing at all. The GAO concluded that the effects
would be limited:
Privatization would likely change the behavior of market
participants and increase average interest rates on fixedrate, single-family mortgages within an average range of
about 15 to 35 basis points. However, privatization
would not mean the end of the secondary mortgage
market, a return to regional disparities in mortgage
interest rates that were not based on differences in risk,
or a lack of mortgage credit in the economy during parts
of the business cycle. It would probably mean that
mortgage rates would increase in areas with higher risks,
for houses with higher loan-to-value ratios, and in
155

Accord Stanton, supra note 6, at 636 (“Life cycle is also an issue.
After some years the government corporations could ‘ossify,’ i.e., begin to
display some of the kinds of bureaucratic infirmities that FHA (for example)
has manifested in recent years.”).
156
See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Lessons Learned: Obtaining Value
From Federal Asset Sales, 23 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 22 (2003).
157
Section 1131 of HERA, Pub. L. 110–289, established a Housing
Trust Fund that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would fund with contributions.
It would be possible to build such an affordable housing program into a
government corporation that serves the mortgage market. See supra note 6, at
636.
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periods of high mortgage demand.158
Just as one must question whether a GSE or other private
institution is properly manageable once it funds, say, a trillion
dollars of mortgages,159 one must also question whether
managers of wholly owned government corporations will be up
to the task. As a matter of protecting taxpayers from excessive
financial risk it would be prudent to limit the size of both public
and private institutions that provide financial support to the
mortgage market. One clear lesson of the current debacle is that
it is risky to maintain immense financial institutions of any kind
over the long term.160
One possible way would be to use a government corporation
to provide government support for limited purposes, such as a
30-year fixed-rate mortgage for selected borrowers such as firsttime homebuyers. Alternatively, concern about size and risk
could lead policymakers to sunset the government corporations
after the mortgage market is back on its feet. In either event, the
model of the wholly owned government corporation would
158

U.S. General Accounting Office, Housing Enterprises: Potential
Impacts of Severing Government Sponsorship, GGD-96-120, May 1996, at
70. A “basis point” is one-one-hundredth of a percentage point.
159
Economist Joseph Stiglitz makes this point about banks:
[T]he problem of too-big-to-fail institutions remains. There are but
two solutions: breaking up the institutions or regulating them
heavily. For reasons that I will make clear, we need to do both.
The only justification for allowing these huge institutions to continue
is that there are significant economies of scope or scale that
otherwise would be lost. I have seen no evidence to that effect . . .
we have little to lose, and much to gain, by breaking up these
behemoths, which are not just too big to fail but also too big to save
and too big to manage.
Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? Examining the Systematic Threats of
Large Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee,
111th Cong. 25–26 (2009) (statement of Joseph Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Prize
Recipient & Professor, Columbia University), available at http://jec.senate.
gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.HearingsCalendar
(follow
“April
21st—Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save?” hyperlink; then follow “Joseph
Stiglitz” hyperlink).
160
See id.
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remain available when needed to provide government support
for the mortgage market in the event of any future crisis.
CONCLUSION: USE THE FORMER GSES EXTENSIVELY AT FIRST
AND THEN FOR MORE LIMITED SUPPORT OF THE MORTGAGE
MARKET
The government-sponsored enterprise has outlived its
usefulness as an instrument of government policy. While other
financial institutions have also shown vulnerability, the GSE
appears to be especially prone to dominating and ultimately
evading any reasonable accountability structure. GSEs are
simply too powerful for their own good. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, now demonstrably insolvent, should be placed into
receivership and turned into wholly owned government
corporations that could sunset after perhaps five years. As such
they could support the mortgage market, not only through their
access to government funding, but also by imposing rules for
consumer and investor protection, capital requirements on
mortgage market participants, and other protective measures that
policymakers could apply to the rest of the housing finance
system. Also, they could help to shore up potentially vulnerable
government agencies such as the FHA that are playing
increasingly important roles in the mortgage market. After that,
when circumstances have improved, policymakers can decide
whether the needs of the housing market should be served by a
government corporation, and how to shape that government
corporation to address those needs. Especially for the next few
years, but also potentially for the longer term, the wholly owned
government corporation is an organizational form that offers
great promise as a source of support for the mortgage market.

